A Second Look At Our Risk Assessments?

I came across this Akamai Security Blog post recently which I thought was a useful and informative read overall. As I read through the blog post however, something caught my attention. It is the phrase “The vendor considers the threat posed by the vulnerability”.  That prompted me to write this post …. on the need for extreme due diligence in security risk assessments and the critical importance for the engagement sponsors to keep the assessment teams on their toes. (Note: Just to be doubly clear, the objective here is not to pick on the Akamai post but to discuss certain key points about Security Risk Assessments)

When it comes to Security Risk Assessments (or Security Risk Analysis if the HIPAA Security Rule is of any relevance to you), I believe that terminology is extremely important. Those of us who have performed a “true” risk assessment know for a fact that the terms threat, vulnerability, likelihood, impact and risk mean specific things. In the case of this specific Akamai post, I think the author may have used the word “threat” instead of “risk” somewhat inaccurately. While it may not be significant in the context of this particular blog post, I believe that using these terms inaccurately can mean all the difference in the quality and usefulness of actual risk assessments. In my experience, more often than not, such misplaced terminology is a symptom of the lack of due diligence on the part of the person or the team doing the assessment. Considering that risk assessments are so “foundational” to a security program, we strongly recommend addressing such redflags very early in a Risk Assessment engagement.

In fact, I would like to suggest that the sponsors ask the following questions of the consultants or teams performing the risk assessment as early as pertinent in the engagement:

  • Have you identified the vulnerabilities accurately and do you have the evidence to back up your findings?
  • Have you identified all the relevant threats that can exploit each vulnerability?
  • How did you arrive at the likelihood estimation of each threat exploiting each vulnerability? Can you back up your estimation with real, known and published information or investigation reports on exploits over the recent past (say three years)? Did you consider the role of any and all compensating controls we may have in possible reduction of the likelihood estimates?
  • Does your Risk Ranking/Risk Statement clearly articulate the “real” risk (and not some imagined or assumed risk) to the organization, supported by the Likelihood and Impact statements?
  • When proposing risk mitigation recommendations, have you articulated the recommendations in actionable terms? By “Actionable”, we mean something that can be readily used to build a project plan to initiate the risk mitigation effort(s).
  • If answers to any of the above questions seem negative or even tentative, the assessment may not be serving the organization’s risk management objectives. In my experience, most risk assessments turn out be no more than mere Control or Gap Assessments, which don’t need to be conducted by the often “Highly Paid” consultants, quite frankly. 

    A “true” risk assessment requires to be performed by a security practitioner or team that has the inquisitive mind, depth and breadth of relevant security skillsets as well as the knowledge of current security threat/vulnerability environment.

    You may also find the following posts from our blog relevant and useful:

    Top 10 Pitfalls – Security or Privacy Risk Assessments
    Compliance obligations need not stand in the way of better information security and risk management
    Next time you do a Risk Assessment or Analysis, make sure you have Risk Intelligence on board

    Please don’t hesitate to post your feedback or comments.

0 Comments

Submit a Comment

Your email address will not be published. Required fields are marked *

Kamal Govindaswamy

Posted on

January 26, 2014